Dear Editor,
I wish to express serious concern regarding the recently announced tint policy, to be implemented effective January 1, 2026, as communicated by the Honourable Oneidge Walrond. While the stated objective of improving public safety is commendable, the manner in which this policy is being advanced raises fundamental legal and constitutional questions that cannot be ignored in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between a policy and a law. A policy is a guiding framework or statement of intent adopted by a government, ministry, or institution to direct decision-making and action toward specific objectives. It articulates what is intended and how goals are to be pursued. However, a policy does not in itself carry the force of law unless it is supported by enabling legislation or properly promulgated regulations.
A law, by contrast, is a formally enacted and legally binding rule established through the National Assembly or other constitutionally recognised authority. Laws define rights, duties, and prohibitions, and they are enforceable by the state, with clearly articulated penalties for non-compliance.
Against this background, the public is entitled to ask: how can a policy, absent a supporting legal framework approved by the National Assembly, be implemented as a punitive measure? If a driver is deemed to be in breach of this tint policy, under which section of which law will that individual be charged? On what statutory authority will a fine of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00) be imposed?
In the absence of an amended Act, subsidiary legislation, or gazetted regulations specifying offences and penalties, enforcement becomes legally questionable. Policies may guide enforcement priorities, but they cannot create offences, impose fines, or restrict citizens’ rights. To do so without Parliamentary approval risks undermining due process, legal certainty, and public confidence in the justice system.
Equally troubling is the notion that a policy can be operationalised before the passage of the necessary law. In constitutional practice, the sequence is clear: policy informs legislation; legislation authorises enforcement. Reversing this order sets a dangerous precedent, where executive policy effectively substitutes for law.
If government intends to regulate vehicle tinting in the interest of national and human security, the appropriate course is transparent legislative action; debated, amended where necessary, and approved by the National Assembly, so that citizens are fully aware of their legal obligations and the consequences of non-compliance.
Something is clearly not right when a policy is presented as law, fines are announced without citation of statutory authority, and enforcement is expected without legal grounding. This matter deserves urgent clarification in the interest of constitutional governance and the rule of law.