Dear Editor,
INTRODUCTION:
THE recent public discourse surrounding the United States’ actions in Venezuela has once again illuminated a perennial dilemma in international relations: The persistent tension between principled reasoning and strategic reality.
Several prominent commentators, including former President Mr. Donald Ramotar, former Opposition Leader Mr. Aubrey Norton, and columnist Ms. Abena Rockcliffe, have each engaged this moment through the lenses of international law, sovereignty, and the inherent vulnerability of small states in a world structured by great-power dominance.
These interventions are neither frivolous nor ill-intentioned. They draw upon moral philosophy, historical experience, and a legitimate apprehension that the selective enforcement of international norms ultimately weakens the very protections upon which smaller states depend. Yet, foreign policy, particularly for states confronting immediate and existential strategic threats, cannot be sustained on moral abstraction alone. It must be grounded in a sober, unsentimental appraisal of power, deterrence, alliances, and survival as they actually function within the international system.
On former President Mr. Donald Ramotar: Principle and the Limits of Ideal Conditions:
Former President Ramotar has characterised the United States’ actions in Venezuela as a return to what he has described as “gunboat diplomacy”, and as a troubling erosion of respect for
international law. He has warned that when powerful states act with apparent impunity, smaller states may ultimately find themselves exposed, once the normative restraints they rely upon have been sufficiently weakened.
This position is intellectually coherent and, in ideal circumstances, normatively sound.
International law does matter, particularly to small states. Yet history demonstrates that international law has rarely functioned as an effective shield in moments of acute strategic confrontation. From Iraq and Libya to Syria and Panama, sustained diplomatic objections by major powers such as Russia, China, India, and Brazil did not prevent action once a dominant power resolved to proceed.
The limiting factor, therefore, was not moral insufficiency, but the reality of structural power asymmetry embedded within the international order.
For Guyana, presently confronted by explicit territorial claims, military posturing, and coercive
rhetoric from Venezuela, the operative question is not whether international law ought to be universally applied, a proposition few would dispute, but whether public rhetorical opposition to its principal security guarantor would enhance or instead compromise national survival. In
Guyana’s specific circumstances, principle detached from deterrent power does not fortify sovereignty; it places it at risk.
On former Opposition Leader, Mr. Aubrey Norton: Sound Counsel Under Non-Ideal
Conditions:
Mr. Aubrey Norton has urged caution and restraint, emphasizing the importance of diplomacy and measured positioning in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. Such counsel is prudent and reflects a sober appreciation of the dangers inherent in impulsive or emotionally driven statecraft.
However, caution must not be conflated with strategic neutrality where neutrality itself carries risk.
Guyana’s defense architecture, diplomatic leverage, and deterrent credibility are inextricably
linked to its alignment with the United States and its partners. Venezuela’s conduct, ranging from referendum theatrics to overt military signaling and explicit territorial assertions has already demonstrated a willingness to test Guyana’s sovereignty.
In asymmetrical confrontations of this nature, ambiguity weakens deterrence. Prudence, therefore, does not lie in symbolic equidistance, but in strategic clarity, particularly where existential interests are implicated and the costs of misjudgment are severe.
On Ms. Abena Rockcliffe: Moral Warning and Contextual Reality:
Ms. Abena Rockcliffe has invoked the well-known post-war reflection attributed to Martin
Niemöller, commonly paraphrased as “First they came…”, as a warning against silence in the face of perceived injustice. Niemöller’s reflection, written in the aftermath of the collapse of Nazi Germany, cautioned against societal passivity as successive groups were targeted until no one remained to speak.
The moral force of that warning is undeniable. Yet its original context was one of internal
repression under a totalitarian regime, where silence facilitated the consolidation of tyranny.
Guyana’s predicament is categorically different. This is not a case of internal persecution sustained by domestic acquiescence, but a geopolitical confrontation shaped by overwhelming power asymmetry and immediate territorial risk.
It is instructive to note that even Venezuelan officials themselves, the direct subjects of American action have sought to moderate rhetoric, pursue diplomatic off-ramps, and avoid uncontrolled escalation.
If the state most immediately affected recognises the limits of confrontation, it is
reasonable to question the strategic wisdom of Guyana assuming rhetorical positions that invite
exposure without delivering protection.
On Other Principled Voices: Rhetoric, Support, and the Limits of Commitment:
Across the Global South, it is common for states to articulate principled objections to unilateral
American action and to present themselves, rhetorically at least, as counterweights to United States power. Russia, China, India, Brazil, and others routinely invoke the language of sovereignty, non-intervention, and international legality in multilateral forums, often with considerable moral force.
It would be neither accurate nor fair to suggest that such states offer no assistance to partners under pressure. Military hardware, diplomatic cover, economic engagement, and, in select cases, direct intervention has all been provided where such involvement aligns with their own strategic interests.
Yet experience consistently demonstrates that this support is neither unconditional nor
open-ended. When confrontation with American power approaches the threshold of direct and
escalating conflict, assistance becomes carefully calibrated, commitments narrow, and rhetoric
increasingly outpaces action. The appearance of defiance remains; the willingness to incur decisive costs on behalf of another state does not.
This pattern is not evidence of bad faith; it is a reflection of how power is managed in the
contemporary international system. It underscores a sobering reality: expressions of solidarity, however forceful in tone, rarely mature into guarantees of survival when the strategic stakes rise beyond manageable limits.
Conclusion: Survival, Deterrence, and Strategic Obligation:
Guyana is not choosing between morality and immorality. It is choosing between symbolic
expression and national survival.
Its territorial defense, economic stability, and geopolitical insulation are inseparable from a
strategic relationship with the United States, a relationship that has already functioned as a tangible deterrent against Venezuelan adventurism. This relationship has not been theoretical; it has been operational, timely, and consequential.
In this context, Guyana’s posture is not merely a matter of gratitude, but of obligation grounded in survival, deterrence, and strategic continuity. Ideal principles have value, but they cannot substitute for protection when a serious adversary is at the gate.
The international system is governed not by aspiration, but by power, interest, and consequence.
Small states endure not through moral exhibitionism, but through disciplined alignment and
strategic realism.
Guyana must read the world as it is, not as it wishes it to be.