Dear Editor,
In August 2024, a letter to the editor written by Mr. Raj Parmanand endorsed Mr. Paul Cheong as the right candidate to lead the transformation of the sugar industry. That endorsement was based on claims of Mr. Cheong’s “vast private sector experience and business acumen” and his supposed ability to make the hard decisions necessary to place the industry on a path of sustained growth. Subsequent developments have shown how misplaced that confidence was.
Mr. Parmanand’s letter ultimately faltered by implying that the company’s future hinged on Mr. Cheong’s leadership. The empirical record of his tenure does not justify such optimism.
After approximately two years at the helm, GuySuCo’s performance indicators reveal continued deterioration rather than stabilization or revival.
First, financial losses deepened during Mr. Cheong’s tenure. Based on publicly disclosed figures, GuySuCo incurred combined losses estimated at approximately $30 billion over 2024 and 2025. These losses occurred despite repeated assurances that operational reforms were underway. A revitalization effort coinciding with such substantial losses cannot reasonably be described as successful. Today in 2026, the Albion and Blairmont factory, the two largest sugar mills in Guyana are an engineering catastrophe.
Second, production remained at historically depressed levels. Output stood at approximately 47,000 tonnes in 2024 and is at about 59,000 tonnes in 2025, far below what is required (100,000 tonnes) to absorb GuySuCo’s high fixed costs or approach breakeven operations. This occurred even after the addition of a fourth sugar mill at Rose Hall, which was expected to support increased production.
Third, there was no demonstrable reduction in the cost of production. Sugar continued to be produced at above US$1.00 per pound, while the best available market prices remained near US$0.34 per pound. This structural imbalance—central to GuySuCo’s crisis—was neither narrowed nor corrected during Mr. Cheong’s tenure; it actually got worse.
Fourth, GuySuCo remained heavily dependent on Treasury support. Billions of dollars in government transfers continued to be required to sustain operations. Most recently, an additional $400 million in emergency funding was reportedly transferred to the Corporation by the Ministry of Finance to avert industrial unrest at Albion Estate using the Contingency Funds which are assigned for national emergencies like floods etc, highlighting the ongoing fiscal burden on taxpayers. But the Members of Parliament and the taxpayers are totally in the dark on these matters.
Finally, transparency remained inadequate. This continued secrecy limits independent scrutiny of management performance from analysts like Christopher Ram and places both Parliament and taxpayers at a disadvantage, despite their continued financial support of the corporation.
Mr. Parmanand is correct that employment costs, low productivity, and political constraints are central to GuySuCo’s challenges. However, these realities make it even more important to assess leadership by measurable outcomes rather than stated intentions. By that standard, Mr. Cheong’s tenure has been characterized by continued losses, weak production, increasing cost of production, and deeper dependence on the Treasury.
Given these outcomes, it is fair to revisit earlier endorsements and ask whether they were warranted. Any serious analysis of GuySuCo’s predicament must acknowledge that the company’s decline continued under Mr. Cheong’s management, regardless of stated plans or affiliations and direct cover from all levels of the Irfaan Ali-led Government.