Dear Editor,
It is ironic – though not surprising–that former Minister of Finance, Mr. Winston Jordan, has re-emerged to offer his criticism of the PPP/C’s Budget 2026, claiming it “prioritises spending over people” and that “bigger spending does not mean better outcomes.” This is the same former minister who presided over the recalibration of Guyana’s macroeconomic structure between 2015 and 2020 in a manner that weakened the economy, shrank productive sectors, expanded recurrent expenditure at the expense of capital investment, raised taxes, and left households worse off.
Mr. Jordan’s statement is not serious macroeconomic analysis. It is a political talking point dressed up as economics. And when the record is placed side-by-side, it becomes obvious he has no technical authority to lecture Guyanese about fiscal discipline, outcomes, or people-centered budgeting.
Let us start with what budgets are supposed to do. A national budget is not merely a spending plan–it is a development instrument. Capital expenditure is what expands productive capacity, improves infrastructure, strengthens supply-side growth, creates jobs, and raises long-run household income. Yet under Mr. Jordan’s stewardship, the budget was re-engineered into a spending-heavy but development-light framework: recurrent expenditure ballooned to as high as 77% of total expenditure, leaving a mere 23% for capital investment. That is not how you build an economy.
And when productive investment is squeezed, households inevitably feel it. Under his tenure, taxes were raised, industries were shut down or suffocated, and the economy was structurally weakened. It is therefore extraordinary that Mr. Jordan now wants to posture as a guardian of “outcomes.”
Now, because I am not interested in propaganda, I will state upfront what serious analysts must acknowledge: current expenditure has expanded significantly in the post-2020 period, and the sustainability test must be monitored carefully. Current expenditure as a share of non-oil revenue has risen sharply–from 106% in 2021 to 143.9% in 2026–compared to 78% in 2011 and 86% in 2019, and generally below 80% of current revenue in the pre-oil era. This shift requires disciplined containment strategies, stronger non-oil revenue mobilisation, and continued credibility in fiscal management.
However, that is not Mr. Jordan’s argument, and he is not the messenger to credibly raise it. His own tenure was marked not by prudence but by fragility and fiscal mismanagement.
This is not speculation. It is measurable. Under his watch, Guyana’s external buffers deteriorated to some of the lowest levels. Import cover reserves fell to less than two months. That is not fiscal prudence. That is macroeconomic weakness. And it stands in sharp contrast to the pre-oil period under the PPP/C, where reserves were as high as five and eight months at different points–reflecting a stronger macroeconomic posture.
Then there is the infamous overdraft. The overdraft exceeded GYD 100 billion. It was mishandled and utilized in a manner that contravened the Fiscal Management and Accountability Act (FMAA). That is not fiscal discipline. That is fiscal recklessness.
So, when Mr. Jordan now says “bigger spending does not mean better outcomes,” the first question he must answer is: what outcomes did his spending produce? The record shows weakened macro resilience, deteriorated buffers, reduced productive investment, and squeezed households.
Since Mr. Jordan wants to talk about “people,” let us talk about the most direct indicator of whether policy improves people’s lives: household income.
SphereX’s macro analysis shows that by 2025 total household income reached approximately GYD 939 billion–approaching GYD 1 trillion. And that figure is conservatively understated because the estimates exclude tax-free income and allowances, selected subsidy channels, and importantly exclude the informal economy. According to studies by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the informal economy is in the vicinity of 30% of non-oil GDP. Accordingly, the true household income base is materially larger than the official aggregates reflect.
Mr. Jordan therefore cannot credibly claim Budget 2026 is “spending over people” when the data show household income approaching one trillion dollars–approximately 60% of non-oil GDP, up from 40% of non-oil GDP in 2010–and still understated.
But the most important insight is not merely the size of household income. It is the structural transformation in its composition.
In 2010, remittances accounted for about 51% of total household income. By 2025, remittances declined to about 10%. This is not because remittances fell in nominal terms–remittances grew modestly from about GYD 63 billion to about GYD 90 billion–but because domestically generated income expanded far more rapidly.
At the same time, government support expanded dramatically. Government social welfare support, subsidies and grants increased from about 1.6% of household income in 2010 to about 38.1% in 2025. That is not “spending over people.” That is government cushioning household income, protecting purchasing power, and stabilizing living standards.
And when we exclude remittances to isolate the domestic income base, the evidence becomes even more compelling. Social security plus social support as a share of household income excluding remittances rose from 28% in 2010, to 27% in 2020, to 51% in 2025. For ten years there was no major improvement, but after 2020 there was a step-change. That is the scale of household cushioning now embedded in the domestic income structure.
With these facts on the table, Mr. Jordan’s criticism collapses. Under his tenure, households were squeezed, productive sectors weakened, buffers deteriorated, and macro fragility increased. Under PPP/C policy, household income expanded, domestic income quality improved, and remittance dependence collapsed.
It is worthwhile to note that the size of the budget, though larger in absolute terms, is actually smaller in relative terms–that is, relative to GDP. I am mindful, however that he may be tempted to advance a misleading framing in this regard: that today’s budgets are “smaller as a share of GDP” only because oil GDP inflated the denominator.
Thus, let me address it upfront. First, the national budget today remains around 20% of total GDP, while under Mr. Jordan budgets were around 30% of GDP. In other words, the fiscal footprint of government relative to the economy is not bigger today than it was under him–it is smaller.
Second, yes, if one strips out oil GDP and measures the budget relative to non-oil GDP, the ratio becomes very large–approximately 96%. But oil GDP is not imaginary output. It is real value-added. And even the portion of oil export earnings not captured directly as government revenue is not “lost” to the economy–it is being ploughed back into the development of the Stabroek Block, expanding output capacity and financing new approved fields. That reinvestment expands production, strengthens future government take, and enlarges the national development envelope. Pretending oil does not exist is either ignorance or deliberate deception.
The correct sustainability test is therefore not denying oil output. It is the relationship between recurrent expenditure and recurring non-oil revenue–which I have already addressed transparently.
But unlike Mr. Jordan, the PPP/C is expanding productive capacity alongside social support, while strengthening resilience through buffers. Total net reserves in the financial sector–NRF + Bank of Guyana + banking sector–are equivalent to approximately six months import cover and approximately 1.2 times the sovereign stock of external debt. That is macro strengthening. That is resilience. That is what competent public finance management looks like.
In closing: Mr. Jordan’s criticism is not only disingenuous–it is technically weak. The PPP/C Budget 2025 is not “spending over people.” The data show household income approaching GYD 1 trillion, remittance dependence collapsing from 51% to 10%, government support rising from 1.6% to 38.1%, and excluding remittances, social security plus social support rising to 51% of domestic household income. These are not slogans. These are outcomes.