Dear Editor,
A systemic failure is unfolding within Guyana’s public procurement system, particularly as it pertains to the Ministry of Public Works. The adage “cheap is not good and proves to be expensive in the end” has proven tragically accurate when it comes to how the Ministry of Public Works under Mr. Juan Edghill, is conducting itself. There is more than enough evidence to prove that in Guyana, a growing number of road projects procured and contracted by the Ministry are demonstrating critical failures and requiring full replacement within just five years of completion, when in comparison to what the PNC built in the past in cases like the Linden Highway, the normal life of these roads should be at minimum four to five times longer.
This pattern of premature deterioration points to a fundamental deficiency in engineering supervision. It raises serious questions about the capacity of some engineers within the Government’s Roads Division to adequately oversee major infrastructure projects of this scale.
To illustrate, consider the $2.6 billion Mandela Avenue to Eccles four-lane concrete highway. This 2.4 km corridor, commissioned in April 2022 at a cost of approximately US$5.2 million per kilometer, is already showing signs of advanced structural failure after only three years. Recent site visits by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Azruddin Mohamed, have drawn public attention to the use of substandard materials, specifically the BRC fabric, on this road. A properly engineered concrete roadway of this nature should, at a minimum, provide two decades of uninterrupted service before requiring major intervention. But as the Leader of the Opposition proved, this road is breaking up after three years. Shame on President Irfaan Ali and his team in the Public Works Ministry.
International benchmarks for comparable Caribbean infrastructure, even on more stable soil conditions, typically range around US$10 million per kilometer for a design life of twenty years. It is therefore deeply concerning that Guyana, which contends with notoriously poor soil conditions, is procuring such critical infrastructure at roughly half that cost using some local friends of the PPP who does not have a clue what they are doing. This discrepancy exposes a critical defect in our procurement framework; the technical analysis of past work of the contractors are not up to standard at the tender board.
The concern is that the current system may be facilitating procurement outcomes that prioritize low initial cost over long-term value and structural integrity. There is a perception that certain contractors, with close ties to the PPP, are being guided to submit tenders that are significantly below the engineeringly appropriate cost for the required scope. These artificially low bids are then being validated during the evaluation process by engineers within the Ministry, leading to contracts being awarded on price alone. The inevitable consequence is compromised foundational work that the public cannot see, which leads to massively substandard final deliverables – roads that are crumbling after three years.
A key technical failure lies in the inadequate geotechnical investigation of soil conditions. Without comprehensive site investigations, including proper borings and laboratory testing, the subsequent decisions on soil stabilization methodology and reinforcement design are fundamentally under-engineered. As is axiomatic in construction, an incorrect start condemns every subsequent step. Evidence from these projects points to compromised subgrade preparation, inadequate compaction control, and the approval of geosynthetic materials that fail to meet minimum international standards. When the very foundation is unsound, even a concrete pavement will fail, and we are witnessing that failure in Guyana today.
The fiscal implications are severe. Taxpayers will now likely bear the burden of spending an additional US$10 million per kilometer to rehabilitate these failing roadways—ironically, creating further value for the same contractors who are close friends of the PPP. The net effect is that the ultimate cost to deliver a road built to proper international standards could increase by 150%. For the Mandela to Eccles corridor alone, this could translate to a national loss of $2 to $3 billion.
This situation is further complicated by the Eccles to Diamond corridor. This 9.4 km stretch, which includes 30 new concrete bridges, was contracted for $13.3 billion, significantly higher than the estimated $10 billion cost, if built to best Caribbean practices. While the premium could arguably be attributed to the bridge structures, it cannot explain why this road, too, is already deteriorating in multiple locations after only two years. This raises further questions about quality control.
Guyana’s unprecedented economic growth demands that its public infrastructure be built to last. The current trajectory, however, suggests a system that rewards low upfront cost and political connections while penalizing long-term durability and sound engineering. A thorough, independent review of the procurement and supervision processes within the Ministry of Public Works is not just warranted, but urgently required.
Failure to do this by President Irfaan Ali, can only have one explanation, the PPP is benefiting from the massive act of corruption on the Road Projects in Guyana.