Are we now dealing with the US or still with Chavez’/Maduro’s Venezuela? If so, it’s of greater danger to us than before. If not, and Trump remains in support of Guyana, why is Rodriguez free to publicly advocate the claim instead of being silenced on it? With whom are we (Guyana) dealing with? The US does not, like Venezuela, recognise the ICJ. Is the US in a conflict of interests? What happens if the US is forced to choose when, as expected, the ICJ rules in our favour?

Notably, Sir Ronald Sanders, in his regular comments, has observed, on the subject of Cuba, that: “Cuba, though absent from the Secretary’s formal plenary remarks, was part of private discussions. Subsequent reporting confirms that U.S. officials close to the Secretary met privately in St. Kitts with Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro, grandson and close aide to former Cuban leader Raúl Castro. That meeting confirms that discussions between Washington and Havana are active.

Reports suggest that the United States is exploring a phased easing of sanctions in exchange for incremental economic and governance changes. Secretary Rubio has indicated publicly that the United States is prepared to listen if Cuban authorities are willing to undertake significant economic reforms that expand private enterprise and open space for broader freedoms.

This moment differs from earlier periods of strain. Cuba faces severe economic contraction, energy shortages, and humanitarian pressure. Regional energy dynamics are also shifting. In such circumstances, steady engagement may yield more than isolation alone.

It is further understood that discussions are underway regarding energy arrangements that could allow Venezuelan oil to reach Cuba through controlled channels, easing the island’s acute pressures. These negotiations remain sensitive and incomplete. But they reflect recognition that collapse in Cuba would carry consequences for the wider Caribbean, particularly in migration and regional stability.

CARICOM governments have long advocated dialogue rather than rupture in dealing with Cuba. Public statements by regional leaders emphasised de-escalation, reform, and stability. The indication that Washington is pursuing quiet engagement was therefore noted with interest and, in many quarters, with cautious welcome.

The broader significance of the meeting is clear. The Caribbean is America’s immediate neighbourhood. Trade flows in both directions. Migration binds families. Security threats move across maritime space without regard to borders.

The United States seeks secure borders, stable neighbours, and resilient economic ties. CARICOM states seek growth, climate resilience, and protection against transnational crime. These aims intersect.

If reinvigoration means deeper security cooperation, structured and lawful migration arrangements, investment that integrates Caribbean economies into resilient supply chains, and pragmatic engagement to reduce instability in Venezuela and Cuba, then the meeting in Basseterre may prove consequential.

If it becomes a series of expectations unsupported by proportional safeguards, friction will return. Small states guard sovereignty carefully because sovereignty is their shield. That instinct is not obstruction. It is prudence.”

Gerald A. Perreira writes castigating President Ali for stating in a Fox News interview that “the status quo cannot remain and we agree that there must be an attempt to have the status quo changed” in referring to Cuba, so that Cuba must “benefit from prosperity and democracy” while deriding Guyana by comparison.

People like Perreira who write this kind of nonsense need to ask themself a simple question: “If I lived in Cuba what would happen to me if I dare write such a letter?”

Yours sincerely,
Kit Nascimento