Dear Editor,
Why were VPAC, WIN, FGM and the other parties now demanding changes to GECOM not equally concerned about the absence of fixed terms for commissioners before the parliamentary balance shifted in their favour? If indefinite tenure is truly the problem, why is there no comparable urgency regarding the tenure of the other commissioners or the chairperson?
These questions matter because the current debate reflects a clear pattern of selective reasoning. The same constitutional arrangement existed before the 2025 elections, yet it did not generate this coordinated demand for institutional change. Only after WIN became the largest opposition grouping did GECOM’s composition suddenly become an alleged democratic crisis. WIN and some of its supporters also speak as though the parliamentary opposition consists of WIN alone, when it remains composed of several non-governmental political parties. This raises a legitimate question: is the argument based on constitutional principle, or on immediate political advantage?
Article 161 of the Constitution provides for six GECOM commissioners. Three are appointed by the president acting in his own deliberate judgment, while three are appointed by the president acting on the advice of the leader of the opposition after meaningful consultation with the non-governmental political parties represented in the national assembly.
That provision establishes the appointment process. It does not expressly state that the tenure of sitting commissioners automatically expires when another party becomes the largest opposition bloc or when a new Leader of the opposition assumes office. Nor does it allocate opposition-appointed commissioners proportionally according to the number of parliamentary seats held by individual parties.
That commission is central to the dispute. The constitution explains how commissioners enter office, but does not connect their continued tenure to changing seat totals or political realignments. Their removal is governed by separate constitutional protections and procedures. A sitting commissioner cannot simply be dismissed because another political party now wants the position.
There is, admittedly, a genuine legal disagreement. Some commentators argue that the representational purpose of Article 161 should permit a newly elected leader of the opposition to advise that different commissioners be appointed after consulting the other opposition parties. Others argue that sitting commissioners cannot be replaced without resignation, lawful removal, judicial clarification, or constitutional reform. That disagreement should be resolved through authoritative constitutional interpretation, not through political statements presented as settled law.
VPAC contends that GECOM must reflect Guyana’s “new opposition reality.” Politically, that position may sound reasonable. Legally, however, representational fairness and constitutional authority are not the same thing. A political party cannot reconstitute an independent constitutional body merely because the parliamentary balance has changed and it believes the current arrangement no longer benefits it. If the framework has become outdated, the honest argument is that Guyana needs constitutional reform.
The inconsistency becomes clearer when the pressure is focused almost entirely on the commissioners historically associated with the PNCR-led opposition. If the real concern is indefinite tenure, why was this institutional design not considered intolerable before WIN gained more opposition seats? Why is the proposed solution primarily about transferring particular positions from one opposition party to another rather than comprehensively reforming the appointment and tenure of the entire commission?
These questions do not mean that the existing system is ideal. GECOM’s structure developed within a political landscape dominated by two principal blocs, while Guyana now has a more fragmented opposition. There is a credible case for reviewing the system to establish fixed terms, transparent appointment standards, broader consultation, clearer succession procedures, and a mechanism that better reflects a changing political environment.
However, reform must be principled and consistent. It cannot mean preserving the existing arrangement when it produces one political outcome, then discovering a constitutional emergency when the balance of advantage changes.
It is also misleading to link GECOM commissioners directly to parliamentary seats. Commissioners are not members of parliament, and Article 161 does not distribute their positions according to each party’s electoral strength. They serve on a constitutional commission responsible for electoral policy, administration, oversight, and public confidence in the electoral process.
The fact that WIN became the largest opposition grouping may strengthen its political case for reform, consultation, voluntary resignations, or judicial clarification. It does not, by itself, create vacancies or give WIN ownership of the offices occupied by sitting commissioners.
WIN’s initial attempts to remove opposition-appointed commissioners and replace the Opposition Chief Scrutineer also raised concerns about its understanding of the legal and institutional boundaries surrounding those positions. A party seeking greater influence over the electoral system should first demonstrate a sound understanding of the constitutional structure it wishes to change.
The public should therefore reject oversimplification from every side. Sitting commissioners should not pretend that the current arrangement is immune from scrutiny. WIN and its advocates should not pretend that a change in political fortunes automatically rewrites the Constitution. VPAC should not present its preferred interpretation of democratic representation as though it were an express constitutional command.
If GECOM’s present composition no longer serves Guyana’s democratic needs, then let us pursue comprehensive reform. Establish fixed terms. Clarify whether changes in parliamentary leadership affect future appointments. Consider mechanisms for broader opposition consultation and representation. Apply the same standards to every commissioner, every party, and the Chairperson.
What Guyana should not accept is selective constitutionalism, where the meaning of the law changes depending on who has recently gained or lost political advantage.