Dear Editor,
I have been following with great interest the ongoing debate in your newspaper regarding the resource curse and its relationship with institutions. It is an important discussion, particularly for a country like Guyana, where the discovery of vast oil resources has placed questions of governance, accountability, transparency and economic management at the centre of the debate about the resource curse.
However, I believe one important distinction has become blurred in this debate. The original discussion about institutions in the context of the resource curse was largely about democratic institutions, the need for transparency, accountability, greater access to information and parliamentary oversight. It was not initially a debate about economic institutions associated with market reforms, deregulation, privatisation or the liberalisation of markets.
The example of Chile is instructive precisely because it challenges the argument that democratic institutions are always a prerequisite for economic transformation. Chile’s so-called “Economic Miracle” began not under a democratic government, but under the authoritarian rule of General Augusto Pinochet following the 1973 military coup.
The period remains deeply controversial because Pinochet’s regime was responsible for grave human rights violations. That cannot and should not be ignored. But from an economic perspective, it is also a historical fact that some of Chile’s most dramatic economic changes occurred in the absence of democratic institutions.
The so-called Chicago Boys introduced sweeping market reforms beginning in the mid-1970s: trade liberalisation, fiscal discipline, privatisation, deregulation and a move away from state-led economic management. These reforms were implemented under a dictatorship where political opposition was suppressed and democratic accountability was absent.
Yet the economy recorded periods of remarkable growth. After the initial economic shock, Chile grew rapidly between 1977 and 1981, with annual GDP growth rates of approximately 10 per cent, 8 per cent, 8 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. Following the severe debt crisis of 1982 — when GDP contracted by roughly 14 per cent — the economy rebounded strongly, recording growth rates of about 6 per cent in 1984, 5.7 per cent in 1986, 5.9 per cent in 1987, 7.3 per cent in 1988 and over 10 per cent in 1989.
The point is not to celebrate authoritarianism. It is to highlight an economic reality: the absence of democratic institutions did not prevent the implementation of market-oriented reforms or the generation of economic growth. In other words, one cannot simply argue that strong democratic institutions are always the necessary precondition for economic transformation.
However, there is another factor in the Chilean story that deserves far greater attention, resource dominance.
Chile’s economic success cannot be explained solely by what was called “shock capitalism.” It was also built upon the enormous importance of copper, a resource that has long been the backbone of the Chilean economy. The country’s ability to generate export earnings, attract investment and accumulate wealth was significantly influenced by its position as the world’s largest copper producer.
This raises an important question for Guyana. When discussing the resource curse, we should not focus only on whether countries possess strong democratic institutions. We must also examine the nature of the resource itself, the global demand for that resource, how revenues are managed and whether the economy can diversify beyond dependence on a single commodity.
Chile’s experience suggests that neither institutions nor markets alone provide a complete explanation. A country can grow without robust democratic institutions, but resource advantages matter enormously. Likewise, strong institutions are valuable, but they do not automatically create prosperity.