Dear Editor,
The sinking of the MV Barima is an unprecedented tragedy which resulted from a series of unfortunate events, events which were caused by acts or omissions of the Goods Superintendent, the Captain, and his Chief Mate.
On July 18, 2026, at about 15:30h, the MV Barima departed the Kingston Wharf. At departure, the vessel was carrying unmanifested passengers, vehicles, and unsecured cargo. The Captain and Goods Superintendent had oversight of passengers and cargo; the vessel was overladen on both counts.
During the course of the journey, the vessel began to take on water. Concerns about the water were raised with the Captain by passengers; they were brushed off. No actions were taken; instead, the Captain, who was responsible for the safety of everyone on board, was observed imbibing and smoking cannabis while in charge of the vessel.
The Captain retired to his cabin, presumably under the influence, leaving the Chief Mate in charge of the vessel when it capsized and sank shortly after. The Chief Mate also abandoned his post, despite the hours of darkness, the tumultuous ocean, and his responsibility for manning the vessel. He, like his Captain, was in his cabin, leaving the fate of all onboard to a mere deckhand.
No actions were taken by the Captain or the Chief Mate to alert innocent sleeping passengers of impending danger. They were literally sleeping on the job. Despite the vessel being equipped with life jackets, no steps were taken to rouse passengers or to distribute survival gear; incidentally, the Captain was rescued wearing a life jacket. Hours later, when he had been rescued, the Captain’s behaviour prompted alcohol and drug testing, which confirmed survivor accounts that he had been drinking and smoking onboard.
Rough seas were entirely foreseeable while traversing a known route in the Atlantic Ocean. Unsecured cargo shifting during rough seas was obviously capable, to trained and experienced seamen, of affecting the vessel’s centre of gravity and its stability. About nine nautical miles from shore, water and cargo, both on the deck where they ought not to be, led to the cargo shifting. The high number of tragic deaths which resulted from this catastrophe is a direct consequence of a series of failures, especially those of the Captain and Chief Mate.
The recently laid murder charges have been the subject of much scrutiny from both the qualified and the unqualified. Indeed, in common law jurisdictions, the mens rea for murder in most cases is an intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. However, a principle which is decades old is the use of foreseeability by the prosecution to satisfy that element by proving indirect or oblique intent. If a person sets fire to the only exit of an occupied home to scare someone, they cannot claim they “didn’t mean to murder” if they foresaw that escape was virtually impossible.
In old English cases such as Regina v Doherty (1887) 16 Cox CC 306, where exceptions to specific intention were established, to R v Woollin [1999] AC 82, which is still being referenced in 2026 by English courts, the absence of specific intent does not undermine a charge of murder. As recently as 2014, a Captain of a vessel in South Korea was convicted of murder. The reasoning of the court was that although he may not have intended to kill the passengers in the ordinary sense, he knowingly abandoned them in circumstances where death was a virtual certainty and a foreseeable consequence.
Several English and Commonwealth authorities consistently enunciate foreseeability, because it has been long established that malice aforethought implies that death would or might be caused.
The omissions of the persons charged in ensuring that the number of passengers and cargo were appropriate to ensure the safety of all onboard are crucial because of the glaring apparent risk of an overladen vessel in the ocean. The cargo was not secured, another obvious risk of shifting and the adverse impact on the balance of the vessel.
Deliberate actions of using intoxicants cannot be diminished. Failure to take any measures to protect the integrity of the vessel in light of water intake, coupled with failure to issue any warning to passengers and failure to radio in any distress call whatsoever, are all damning in their own right.
The deliberate act of leaving an unqualified, unauthorised deckhand to command the vessel speaks volumes to the lack of regard for the lives onboard the vessel. In this author’s view, death by drowning was a reasonably foreseeable consequence in all the circumstances.
Yours truly,
Jamie Latchman