Dear Editor,
Chief Magistrate Judy Latchman’s declaration that her court “will not be controlled by any mortal being” and “will control its own pace” raises a troubling question: does the Chief Magistrate believe that no person—and, by implication, no superior court—can require her court to proceed efficiently?
Judicial independence protects courts from improper interference. It does not permit a lower court to disregard the rulings, guidance or clear stance of courts above it. The Court of Appeal refused to halt the extradition proceedings against Azruddin Mohamed and Nazar Mohamed, while the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) dismissed their subsequent appeal and allowed the proceedings to continue.[1]
Against those decisions, the Chief Magistrate’s remarks create the unfortunate impression that she has gone rogue and intends to proceed entirely according to her own timetable, regardless of the position adopted by the Court of Appeal and the CCJ. If that is not what she intended to convey, her choice of words was nevertheless extraordinary and deserving of scrutiny.
Equally troubling is the latitude being extended to the defence during its cross-examination of Senior Superintendent Prem Narine. According to reports, the defence submitted more than 300 pages on a disputed line of questioning, only to indicate later that it wished to withdraw the question. Prosecutor Glen Hanoman objected, describing the move as an abuse of the court’s process.[2] He has also accused the defence of embarking on a “fishing expedition” and complained that the extended cross-examination is consuming excessive court time.
Why is questioning being permitted to range so widely, including into matters surrounding the arrest warrants issued by the Chief Magistrate herself? The court must certainly allow the defence to test the prosecution’s evidence, but it also has a responsibility to ensure that questioning remains relevant to the limited purpose of extradition committal proceedings.
These proceedings are not a trial of the underlying US charges.
Would an ordinary Guyanese citizen without the Mohameds’ immense financial resources be granted this degree of latitude? Would that person be allowed to consume days of court time with sprawling questions, voluminous submissions and repeated procedural objections? Or would the court firmly restrict the parties to the relevant issues and insist that the matter advance?
The apparent leniency is especially difficult to reconcile with Magistrate Latchman’s reputation for a firm, no-nonsense approach. In June 2025, entertainer Daniel “Baby Skello” Wharton was denied bail and remanded to prison for a lengthy period when he appeared before her on a blasphemous-libel charge connected to his song “Mother Laxmi Freestyle.”[3] That episode demonstrated how decisively the court could act when dealing with a defendant of comparatively modest means.
Why, then, does a markedly different approach appear to be applied in the Mohameds’ case? Why are their attorneys seemingly afforded such extensive latitude while the proceedings continue month after month?
Wealth and political status must never determine how firmly or efficiently a court manages a case.
The judiciary, civil society, the legal profession and all citizens concerned about equal treatment before the law should examine these developments carefully. The public deserves confidence that no litigant can obtain preferential treatment because of wealth, influence or status—and that every court remains accountable to the law and Guyana’s established judicial hierarchy.